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Abstract
How do di¤erent levels of government debt a¤ect the optimal con-
duct of monetary and scal policies? And what do these optimal poli-
cies imply for the evolution of government debt over time? To provide
an answer, this paper studies a standard monetary policy model with
nominal rigidities and monopolistic competition and adds to it a scal
authority that issues nominal non-state contingent debt, levies distor-
tionary labor income taxes and determines the level of public goods
provision. Higher government debt levels make it optimal to reduce
public spending, so as to dampen the adverse incentive e¤ects of dis-
tortionary taxes, but also strongly inuence the optimal stabilization
response following technology shocks. In particular, higher debt levels
give rise to larger risks to the scal budget and to tax rates. This makes
it optimal to reduce government debt over time. The optimal speed
of debt reduction is missed when using rst order approximations to
optimal policies, but is shown to be quantitatively signicant in a sec-
ond order approximation, especially when technology movements are
largely unpredictable in nature.
Keyword: Ramsey optimal policy, second-order approximation, non-
contingent debt, sticky prices
JEL Class No: E63, E61
1 Introduction
Following the recent nancial crisis and the ensuing Great Recession, gov-
ernments in many OECD economies have implemented expansionary scal
policy measures in addition to o¤ering rescue packages of unprecedented size
to the nancial sector. These decisions have lead to a considerable increase
Thanks go to Eric Leeper and Alex Wolman, as well as to Viktor Winschel, an anony-
mous referee, and seminar participants at the European University Institute, Köln Uni-
versity, and the EER Philadelphia Conference 2010. All errors remain mine.
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in the level of government indebtedness, triggering for some countries even
fears about the sustainability of public nances. Figure 1 illustrates this
fact by depicting the evolution of the central governmentsliabilities in rela-
tion to GDP for a selected group of OECD economies. Debt levels strongly
increased over the period 2007-2009 and the OECD forecasts for the years
2010 and 2011 show that debt levels are expected to increase even further.
These developments raise the important question which normative im-
plications follow from the large build-up of government debt for the conduct
of monetary and scal policy in the future? Should stabilization attempts
in the future depend on the fact that government debt is higher now? Is
it optimal to keep government debt at these elevated levels or should it be
reduced over time? To provide an answer, the present paper analyzes a styl-
ized dynamic equilibrium model and determines how the optimal conduct of
monetary and scal policy depends on the level of accumulated government
debt and how debt evolves under such optimal policies.
The paper considers three government instruments that are generally
considered relevant for the conduct of stabilization policy, namely (1) mon-
etary policy dened as control of the short-term nominal interest rate, (2)
scal policy in the form of spending decisions on public goods, and (3) a scal
nancing decision determining whether to use labor income taxes or govern-
ment debt as means to nance current expenditure, where government debt
is assumed to be nominal and non-state contingent.1 The paper determines
how these tools should be used as stabilization instruments in response to
technology shocks and how this should depend on the level of outstanding
government debt. In addition, it determines how the government debt level
evolves under optimal monetary and scal policies.
The economic environment considered in this paper features three im-
portant distortions. First, rms are assumed to possess monopoly power in
product markets which allows them to charge a mark-up over marginal cost.
This causes output to generally fall short of its rst best level. Second, scal
policy has to use distortionary labor income taxes to nance public goods
provision and interest payments on outstanding government debt. Public
spending and government debt thus have additional adverse labor supply
and output e¤ects. Finally, nominal rigidities in the price of nal goods pre-
vent prices from fully adjusting in response to economic disturbances and
policy measures.2
Each of these distortions has important implications for the optimal con-
duct of policy. Firmsmonopoly power and the fact that the government can
levy only distortionary income taxes make it optimal to reduce government
1Much of the public nance literature treats the government spending process as ex-
ogenous, which is hard to understand from a normative perspective. Exceptions are Adam
and Billi (2008), Leith and Wren-Lewis (2007), or Leith et al. (2009).
2Nominal rigidities, however, also allow monetary policy to a¤ect real interest rates
and thereby the real allocations in the economy.
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Figure 1: Central Government Debt/GDP: History & OECD Forecast
spending below what is suggested by the rst-best allocation rule for pub-
lic and private consumption. It is thereby optimal to reduce public goods
provision more, the higher is the outstanding government debt/GDP ratio.
Furthermore, as in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004), nominal rigidities
prevent the government from using price level changes as an important
source of state-contingent taxation in the presence of nominal government
debt. As a result, government debt optimally follows a near random walk, as
in Barro (1979) and Aiyagari et al. (2002). However, unlike in these latter
papers, the standard deviations of the innovation to this near random walk
crucially depends on the level of outstanding government debt. This result
emerges because the present paper considers a model in which technology
shocks are the underlying driving force. Such shocks give rise to variations
in the tax base and these have larger scal budget implications the larger is
the labor tax rate, i.e., the higher is the outstanding amount of government
debt.3
The fact that larger government debt gives rise to larger risks to the
scal budget and to the tax rate has important implications for optimal
debt dynamics. In particular, it provides incentives to reduce government
debt over time so as to reduce budget risk (provided the initial debt level is
positive). As a result, debt dynamics deviate from random walk behavior in
3 In Barro (1979) and Aiyagari et al. (2002) government spending is assumed exogenous
and spending shocks are the only source of randomness, so that scal budget risks are
largely independent from the government debt level.
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a second order approximation to optimal policy. The quantitative strength of
this force can be signicant, e.g., it can be optimal to reduce the debt/GDP
ratio by about 0.6% each year, but this depends on whether or not the
variance of technology shocks is largely due to predictable or unpredictable
movements. Unpredictable components thereby provide stronger incentives
for debt reduction.
In the present setting, which considers homothetic preferences over pub-
lic and private consumption, debt optimally increases if its initial level is
negative and optimally decreases if the initial level is positive. When initial
government debt is zero, this turns out to be an absorbing state (to sec-
ond order accuracy). Specically, without outstanding debt, it is optimal to
balance any revenue shortfall from an adverse technology shock exclusively
through a corresponding reduction in government spending. Tax rates and
debt then remain unchanged in response to shocks. This suggests that debt
optimally reverts to zero over time.
The economic model in this paper is related to earlier work by Adam
and Billi (2008, 2009). It extends these earlier settings by allowing for
distortionary income taxation and for government debt dynamics at the
same time. Moreover, it considers fully optimal stabilization policies while
previous work was concerned with time-consistent (or discretionary) poli-
cymaking and the design of institutions that would allow overcoming the
distortions generated by the lack of commitment.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the economic
model and derives the implementability conditions summarizing optimal pri-
vate sector behavior. After determining the rst best allocation in section
3, section 4 describes the optimal policy problem and the numerical solution
strategy. It also derives analytical results regarding the deterministic steady
state outcomes associated with optimal monetary and scal policy. The
quantitative implication of government debt for the steady state outcomes
is analyzed in section 5, while section 6 determines the impulse responses
of the economy to technology shocks and shows how these depend on the
outstanding level of government debt. Section 7 discusses the implications
for the optimal drift of government debt over time and shows that the quan-
titative implications arising from budget risk considerations can be sizable.
Section 8 discusses how results change if government spending cannot adjust
in response to technology shocks. A conclusion summarizes.
2 Description of the Economic Model
The next sections adapt the sticky price model presented in Adam and Billi
(2008) to the empirically more relevant setting with distortionary income
taxes and credible government debt. Besides presenting the model ingre-
dients, this section derives the implementability constraints characterizing
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optimal private sector behavior, i.e., derives the optimality conditions deter-
mining householdsconsumption and labor supply decisions and rmsprice
setting decisions.
2.1 Private Sector
There is a continuum of identical households with preferences given by
E0
" 1X
t=0
tu(ct; ht; gt)
#
(1)
where ct denotes consumption of an aggregate consumption good, ht 2 [0; 1]
denotes the labor supply, and gt public goods provision by the government in
the form of aggregate consumption goods. Throughout the paper we impose
the following conditions:
Condition 1 u(c; h; g) is separable in c, h, and g; and uc > 0, ucc < 0,
uh < 0, uhh  0, ug > 0, ugg < 0.
Each household produces a di¤erentiated intermediate good. Demand
for that good is given by
ytd
 ePt
Pt
!
where yt denotes (private and public) demand for the aggregate good, ePt is
the price of the good produced by the household, and Pt is the price of the
aggregate good. The demand function d() satises
d(1) = 1
@d
@( ePt=Pt)(1) = 
where  2 ( 1; 1) is the price elasticity of demand for the di¤erentiated
goods. Importantly, the previously stated assumptions about the demand
function are consistent with optimizing individual behavior when private
and public consumption goods are Dixit-Stiglitz aggregates of the goods
produced by di¤erent households, see Adam and Billi (2008) for details.
The household chooses ePt and then hires the necessary amount of laboreht to satisfy the resulting product demand, i.e.,
zt eht = ytd ePt
Pt
!
(2)
where zt is an aggregate technology shock which evolves according to
zt+1 = (1  z) + zzt + "z;t+1
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with
"z;t+1  iiN(0; 2)
Following Rotemberg (1982) we introduce sluggish nominal price adjustment
by assuming that rms face quadratic resource costs for adjusting prices
according to

2
(
ePtePt 1   1)2
where  > 0. The ow budget constraint of the household is then given by
Ptct+Bt = Rt 1Bt 1+Pt
" ePt
Pt
ytd(
ePt
Pt
)  wteht   
2
(
ePtePt 1   1)2
#
+Ptwtht(1 t)
(3)
where Bt denotes nominal government bonds that pay BtRt in period t+1,
wt is the real wage paid in a competitive labor market, and t is a labor
income tax.4
Although nominal government bonds are the only available nancial in-
strument, adding complete nancial markets for claims between households
would make no di¤erence for the analysis: since households have identical
incomes in a symmetric price setting equilibrium, there exists no incentive
to actually trade such claims. One should note that we also abstract from
money holdings. This should be interpreted as the cashless limit of an
economy with money, see Woodford (1998). Money thus imposes only a
lower bound on the gross nominal interest rate, i.e.,
Rt  1 (4)
each period. Abstracting from money entails that we ignore seigniorage
revenues generated in the presence of positive nominal interest rates. Given
the size of these revenues in relation to GDP in industrialized economies,
this does not seem to be an important omission for the analysis conducted
here.5
Finally, we impose a no Ponzi scheme constraint on household behavior,
i.e.,
lim
j!1
Et
" 
t+j 1Y
i=0
1
Ri
!
Bt+j
#
 0 (5)
The households problem consists of choosing state-contingent processes
{ct; ht;eht; ePt; Bt}1t=0 so as to maximize (1) subject to (2), (3), and (5) taking
as given {yt; Pt; wt; Rt; gt; t}1t=0 as well as the exogenous stochastic produc-
tivity process fztg1t=0.
4Considering instead income or consumption taxes is equivalent to a labor income tax
plus a lump sum tax (on prots).
5As emphasized by Leeper (1991), however, seigniorage may nevertheless be an impor-
tant marginal source of revenue.
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Using equation (2) to substitute eht in (3) and letting the Lagrange multi-
plier on (3) be given by tt=Pt, the rst order conditions of the households
problem are then equations (2), (3), and (5) holding with equality and also
uc;t = t (6)
uh;t =  twt(1  t) (7)
t = Et

t+1
Rt
t+1

(8)
0 = t

ytd(rt) + rtytd
0(rt)  wt
zt
ytd
0(rt)  (t rt
rt 1
  1) t
rt 1

+ Et

t+1(
rt+1
rt
t+1   1)rt+1
r2t
t+1

(9)
where
rt =
ePt
Pt
denotes the relative price. Furthermore, there is the transversality constraint
lim
j!1
Et

t+juc;t+j
Bt+j
Pt+j

= 0 (10)
which has to hold at each contingency.
2.2 Government
The government consists of two authorities. First, there is a monetary au-
thority which controls the nominal interest rates on short-term nominal
bonds through open market operations. Since we consider a cashless limit
economy, the open market operations are innitesimally small allowing us
to abstract from seigniorage revenue. Second, there is a scal authority de-
ciding on the level of government expenditures, labor income taxes and on
debt policy. Government expenditures consist of spending for the provision
of public goods gt and for interest payments on outstanding debt. The level
of public goods provision is a choice variable of the government. The gov-
ernment nances current expenditures by raising labor income taxes and by
issuing new debt so that its budget constraint is given by
Bt
Pt
+ twtht = gt +
Rt 1
t
Bt 1
Pt 1
(11)
The government can credibly commit to repay its debt and government debt
is assumed to be nominal and not state-contingent, consistent with the type
of debt typically issued by governments around the globe. These features
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imply, however, that monetary policy decisions a¤ect the government budget
through two channels: rst, the nominal interest rate policy of monetary
authority inuences directly the nominal return the government has to o¤er
on its instruments; second, nominal interest rate decisions also a¤ect the
price level and thereby the real value of outstanding government debt. Thus,
to the extent that the monetary policy can a¤ect the real interest rate or
the price level, it will a¤ect the government budget, as is the case in Diaz-
Gimenez et al. (2008). In what follows we assume that government debt and
tax policies are such that the no-Ponzi constraint (5) and the transversality
constraint (10) are both satised.
2.3 Rational Expectations Equilibrium
In a symmetric equilibrium the relative price is given by rt = 1 for all t.
The private sectors optimality conditions can then be condensed into a
(non-linear) Phillips curve
uc;t(t   1)t = uc;tzt

ht

1 +  +
uh;t
uc;t(1  t)

zt

+ Et [uc;t+1(t+1   1)t+1] (12)
and a consumption Euler equation
uc;t = Et

uc;t+1
Rt
t+1

(13)
Using (6) and (7) and dening
bt =
Bt
Pt
the government budget constraint can be expressed as
bt   t
1  t
uh;t
uc;t
ht = gt +
Rt 1
t
bt 1 (14)
Denition 1 (Rational Expectations Equilibrium) Given the initial out-
standing debt level (R 1b 1), a Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE)
consists of a sequence of government policies fRt  1; t; gt; btg1t=0 and pri-
vate sector choices fct; ht;tg1t=0 satisfying equations (12) and (13), the
market clearing condition
ct +

2
(t   1)2 + gt = ztht; (15)
the government budget constraint (14), the no-Ponzi constraint (5), and the
transversality condition (10).
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3 First Best Allocation
The rst best allocation, which takes into account only household preferences
and the constraints imposed by the production technology, satises
ug;t = uc;t =  uh;t
zt
which shows that it is optimal to equate the marginal utilities of private
and public consumption to the marginal disutility of work where the latter
is scaled by labor productivity. This simple allocation rule is optimal because
it is equally costly to produce the public and the private consumption goods.
4 Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy
This section describes the monetary and scal policy problem. It is impor-
tant to note that - due to the existence of a number of important economic
distortions - policy can generally not achieve the rst best allocation de-
termined in the previous section. First, market power by rms generally
implies that wages fall short of their marginal product, so that labor supply
and therefore output is too low relative to the optimal allocation.6 Second,
the requirement to nance government expenditure and interest payments on
outstanding government debt with distortionary income taxes additionally
depresses labor supply and output. Third, the presence of nominal rigidi-
ties may prevent the price system from providing the appropriate scarcity
signals. Monetary and scal policy will seek to minimize the e¤ects of all
these distortions. As we will see below, this will involve reducing govern-
ment consumption below its rst best level so as to reduce the averse labor
supply consequences of income taxes.
The optimal policy problem (Ramsey problem) which takes into account
the existence of all these distortion is given by
max
fct;ht;t;Rt1;t;gt;Bt=Ptg1t=0
E0
" 1X
t=0
tu(ct; ht; gt)
#
(16)
s.t.: Equations (12); (13); (14); (15) for all t
R 1b 1 given
6This assumes non-negative income tax rates, as are required when government debt
is non-negative.
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The Lagrangian of the problem is
max
fct;ht;t;Rt1;t;gt;btg1t=0
min
f1t ;2t ;3t ;4t g1t=0
(17)
E0
26666666664
P1
t=0 
tu(ct; ht; gt)
+t1t
 
uc;t(t   1)t   uc;tzt ht

1 +  +
uh;t
uc;t(1 t)

zt

 uc;t+1(t+1   1)t+1
!
+t2t

uc;t
Rt
   uc;t+1t+1

+t3t
 
ztht   ct   2(t   1)2   gt

+t4t

bt   t1 t
uh;t
uc;t
ht   gt   Rt 1t bt 1

37777777775
The rst order necessary conditions for the Lagrangian problem are derived
in appendix A.1. The appendix shows that the nonlinear solution to these
FOCs take the form
yt = g(xt; ) (18)
where yt =
 
ct; ht;t; Rt; t; gt; 
1
t ; 
2
t ; 
3
t ; 
4
t

denote the decision variables
and xt =
 
zt; 
1
t ; 
2
t ; bt 1; Rt 1

the state variables. The parameter  in the
function (18) indicates that the solution depends on the standard deviation
of the technology shocks . The state variables xt evolve according to
zt+1 = z + zzt + z;0"z;t+1 (19)
1t+1 = 
1
t (20)
2t+1 = 
2
t (21)
bt =
t
1  t
uh;t
uc;t
ht + gt +
Rt 1
t
bt 1 (22)
Rt = Rt (23)
The states it (i = 1; 2) denote the lagged Lagrange multipliers associated
with the forward-looking constraints in (17). At time zero, these states as-
sume initial values i0 = 0 (i = 1; 2). As is well known, this gives rise to
transitory non-stationary components in the solution to the optimal policy
problem, even in the absence of shocks. Specically, in the initial period
the policymaker may nd it optimal to generate surprise ination so as
to erode the real value of any outstanding government debt. Likewise, the
policymaker may nd it optimal to transitorily increase taxes. In what fol-
lows, I abstract from these non-stationary deterministic components of op-
timal policy and focus instead on the time-invariant deterministic long-run
outcome. This outcome will be called the Ramsey steady state. Techni-
cally, time-invariance can be achieved by setting the time zero values of i0
(i = 1; 2) equal to their steady state value rather than to zero. Economically,
this amounts to imposing an initial commitment on the policymaker not to
generate surprisemovements in taxes, government spending, or nominal in-
terest rates in period zero. This is standard practice in the optimal taxation
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literature, e.g., Chari et al. (1991). Implicitly, I also impose the constraint
that the policymaker at time t = 0 is required to repay the outstanding debt
R 1b 1. As will be shown below, this constraint is binding; without this
constraint it would be optimal to default on the inherited debt level at time
t = 0.
4.1 Deterministic Steady State: Analytical Results
The model possesses a continuum of deterministic Ramsey steady states,
each of which is associated with a di¤erent level of government debt.7 To
see this note that the rst order condition with respect to bonds from the
optimal policy problem (17) is given by
0 = 4t   Et4t+1
Rt
t+1
In a deterministic steady state, the Euler equation (13) implies
R

=  1
so that the rst order condition for bonds stated above imposes no restric-
tions on the deterministic steady state outcomes: there exists an indetermi-
nacy of dimension one.
Despite the existence of a continuum of deterministic steady states, these
steady states share a number of common properties. As shown in appendix
A.3 all deterministic Ramsey steady states satisfy
 = 1 (24)
R =  1 (25)
Equation (24) shows that it is optimal to implement price stability in the
absence of shocks. This holds independently of the level of outstanding
government debt and shows that it is suboptimal to use ination in steady
state with the objective to reduce the real value of outstanding government
debt. Equation (25) gives the nominal interest rate consistent with price
stability. From  < 1 it follows that nominal interest rates are positive.
Using the steady state real interest rate derived above, the steady state
government budget constraint can be written as
twtht = gt + ex (26)
with ex given by ex = ( 1   1)b
7The di¤erent deterministic steady states also imply di¤erent values for the initial state
variables i0, as explained in the previous sections. This is the case because the incentives
to generate surprisemovements in policy vary with the initial debt level.
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and denoting the interest rate payments on outstanding government debt.
From an economic point of view, interest payments involve just income re-
distribution, but in an environment with distortionary taxation such redis-
tribution is costly to provide and has real consequences. It is through this
channel that government debt a¤ects the optimal allocations.
Appendix A.3 shows that is optimal to set
 uh  ug (27)
with a strict inequality if government debt is positive (or at least not too
negative). Equation (27) demonstrates that it is optimal to reduce public
spending to a level below that suggested by consumer preferences and tech-
nology, i.e., below the rst best allocation rule determined in section 3. The
economic rationale for restraining spending on public goods provision can
be seen from the following equation which is also derived in appendix A.3:
 uh =

1 + 

  g + ex
h

uc (28)
It shows that there exists a wedge between the marginal utility of (private)
consumption and the disutility of labor that depends on the steady state
interest payments ex.8 The wedge thereby consists of two components: rst,
the monopoly power, which leads to the price mark-up 1+ ; second, the
need to nance public expenditure and interest rate payments through dis-
tortionary taxation, which gives rise to the additional term in equation (28).
Reducing public spending below its rst best level, as suggested by equation
(27), reduces the required labor tax rates and therefore helps reducing the
overall wedge between the marginal utility of private consumption and the
marginal utility of leisure. This suggests that in an economy with a higher
stock of real government debt, i.e. a higher ex, the incentives to reduce public
consumption below its rst best level are stronger (ceteris paribus), simply
because taxes are high already due to the high interest burden.
Interestingly, equation (28) shows that the steady state distortions could
be entirely eliminated if the government had accumulated a su¢ ciently large
amount of claims against the private sector, so that interest income allows
to (1) o¤set the monopoly distortions via negative labor income tax rates
and (2) to pay for (the rst best level of) public goods provision.
4.2 Numerical Solution and Model Calibration
This section explains how one can determine locally approximate solutions
for the optimal policies of the stochastic version of the model. Since there
exists a continuum of deterministic steady states, one has to exogenously
8This is true whenever ex is not too negative, i.e., whenever the government has not
accumulated a too high level of claims against the private sector.
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choose one of the steady state dimensions. This is done by xing the initial
real value of outstanding government bonds b 1 inherited from the past
(which may be negative in case the government has accumulated claims
against the private sector).9 One can then determine the steady state values
for the remaining variables that solve the system of rst order conditions of
problem (17).10 Finally, one can determine rst and second order accurate
approximations to the optimal non-linear policy functions (18) and the state
transition equations (40)-(44) using perturbation techniques. Details of the
procedure are provided in appendix A.2.
For the numerical exercises the following preference specication is con-
sidered, which satises condition 1 and is consistent with balanced growth
u(ct; ht; gt) = log (ct)  !h h
1+'
t
1 + '
+ !g log (gt) (29)
with !h > 0, !g  0 and the parameter '  0 denoting the inverse of
the Frisch labor supply elasticity. The model is calibrated as summarized
in table 1 below, following Adam and Billi (2008). The quarterly discount
factor is chosen to match the average ex-post U.S. real interest rate, 3:5%,
during the period 1983:1-2002:4. The value for the elasticity of demand
implies a gross mark-up equal to 1.2. The elasticity of labor e¤ort is assumed
to be one (' = 1) and the values of !h and !g are chosen such that in the
deterministic Ramsey steady state without government debt, agents work
20% of their time and it is optimal to spend 20% of total output on public
goods. Appendix A.4 provides details on how the parameters have to be
chosen to achieve this. The price stickiness parameter is selected such that
the log-linearized version of the Phillips curve (12) is consistent with the
estimates of Sbordone (2002), as in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004). The
quarterly standard deviation of the technology shocks is 0.6% and the shocks
have a quarterly persistence equal to z = 0:95.
9One also needs to set the nominal interest rate that has been promised on the initial
outstanding debt level. Since only b 1R 1 matters for the economic outcomes, one can
set without loss of generality R 1 =  1.
10This assumes that the maximum tax revenue that can be raised according to the
models La¤er curve is su¢ cient to pay for the interest payments the assumed outstanding
debt level, see the discussion in the next section.
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Figure 2: Steady State Tax Rates
Parameter Denition Assigned Value
quarterly discount factor  = 0:9913
price elasticity of demand  =  6
degree of price stickiness  = 17:5
1/elasticity of labor supply ' = 1
utility weight on labor e¤ort !h = 19:792
utility weight on public goods !g = 0:2656
technology shock process persistence z = 0:95
quarterly s.d. technology shock innovation  = 0:6%
Table 1: Baseline Calibration
5 Steady State Implications of Government Debt
This section explores the quantitative implications of di¤erent government
debt levels for the deterministic steady state outcomes and steady state
welfare. While the qualitative implications have been discussed in section
4.1, this section shows that government debt gives rise to quantitatively
important steady state e¤ects.
Using the calibration from the previous section, table 2 below reports the
steady state outcomes for private consumption, hours worked, government
consumption and taxes for alternative initial debt levels. The last column of
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Figure 3: Steady State Welfare Implications of Government Debt
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Figure 4: La¤er Curve
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the table lists the welfare equivalent consumption variation that is required
each period to make agents in the zero debt steady state as well o¤ as in the
considered alternative debt scenarios.11 The outcomes for initial government
debt levels equal to 100% and 200% of GDP, respectively, show that higher
debt requires considerably higher income tax rates. These distort down-
ward labor supply and thereby private consumption. Public consumption
also decreases to avoid an even further increase in tax rates. The welfare
implications of debt are large by any conventional standards and amount to
5.6% and 11% of consumption each period, respectively. This shows that
there exist strong incentives for the Ramsey planner to default on the initial
level of outstanding debt R 1b 1 at time t = 0.
The table also reports the steady state outcome under a scenario with
large negative government debt. The level of government claims against the
private sector in this scenario is chosen so that the interest income earned by
the government allows to pay for the rst best level of public consumption
and to o¤set the adverse labor supply e¤ects of monopolistic competition
via a negative income tax rate. Such a policy eliminates all steady state dis-
tortion in the economy, i.e., achieves the rst best deterministic steady state
allocation. This gives rise to a welfare increase of 70% of consumption each
period. Monopoly power by rms and the requirement to raise government
revenue trough distortionary income taxes thus give rise to large distortions
in the economy, even in a setting where government debt is zero.
Overall, the e¤ects of di¤erent steady state debt/GDP ratios on the
allocations and tax rates are surprisingly linear. Figure 2 provides as an
example for this outcome and depicts the optimal steady state tax rate as
a function of the steady state debt/GDP ratio. The linearity emerges even
though the model features an important non-linearity resulting from the
La¤er curve. Figure 4 shows the steady state tax revenue as a function of
the debt/GDP ratio (which gure 2 shows to be close to linearly related
to the tax rate). At some point, tax revenue ceases to increase with the
tax rate, implying that there exists a maximum sustainable deterministic
steady state debt/GDP ratio. For the baseline calibration this level lies just
above 1000% of GDP. Despite the existence of a La¤er curve, optimal taxes
increase only about linearly with the debt/GDP ratio because government
consumption optimally falls (approximately linearly) as the debt/GDP ratio
increases.
11Let (cZ;hZ ; gZ) denote the allocation in the zero debt steady state and (cA;hA; gA)
the allocation in some alternative steady state. The table reports the percent increase
in consumption v making the zero debt steady state welfare-equivalent to the alternative
steady state, i.e.,
log (cZ  (1 + v))  !h h
1+'
Z
1 + '
+ !g log (gZ) = log (cA)  !h h
1+'
A
1 + '
+ !g log (gA)
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priv. hours gov. taxes welfare equiv.
cons. cons. cons. variation
(c) (h) (g) ()
Zero debt 0.16 0.2 0.04 24% 0.00%
100% debt/GDP 0.1558 0.1944 0.0386 28.0% -5.58%
Change wrt zero debt -2.61% -2.78% -3.47% +16.8%
200% debt/GDP 0.1516 0.1888 0.0372 32.0% -11.0%
Change wrt zero debt -5.25% -5.62% -7.02% +33.3%
First best steady state
-1076% debt/GDP 0.2 0.2530 0.0530 -20% +70.6%
Change wrt zero debt +25% +26.5% +32.5% n.a.
Table 2: Steady State E¤ects of Government Debt
The same approximate linearity holds true for the consumption equiva-
lent welfare losses, which are shown in gure 3. The convexity of the utility
function implies, however, that the utility gains from consumption increases
are somewhat smaller than the utility gains from consumption losses. The
relationship between the debt/GDP ratio and steady state utility is thus
convex, with increasing convexity at high debt/GDP ratios.
6 Stabilization Policy and Budget Risks fromGov-
ernment Debt
This section studies the optimal monetary and scal policy response follow-
ing a technology disturbance and shows how the optimal stabilization policy
depends critically on the initial level of government debt. Specically, under
the optimal monetary and scal policy the government budget is exposed
to larger risks from technology shocks, the larger is the outstanding level
of government debt. Since rst order accurate approximations to the opti-
mal stabilization policies abstract from such risk considerations, rst order
approximations miss an important aspect of the truly optimal stabilization
policy and wrongly predict debt to evolve like a random walk.
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Figure 5: Impulse Response to a Negative Technology Shock (-3 std. dev.)
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Figure 5 illustrates that the level of government debt has important
implications for the conduct of stabilization policy and for the evolution of
government debt. The gure reports the dynamics implied by optimal policy
around two alternative deterministic Ramsey steady states, one where the
initial level of government debt level is zero and one where it equals 100% of
GDP. Figure 5 depicts the rst-order accurate impulse responses to a large
negative technology shock.12 The shock size equals 3 unconditional standard
deviations and implies that technology temporarily drops by about 5.7%,
thereafter slowly reverts to steady state.13
Under both debt scenarios, output, private and public consumption all
drop by about the same amount as technology.14 Notable di¤erences across
the two scenarios emerge, however, when considering the optimal responses
of ination, nominal interest rates, taxes, and government debt.
When government debt is zero, there is no response of ination, taxes or
debt whatsoever. The reasons is that it is optimal to o¤set the reduction in
tax revenue resulting from the negative technology shock by a corresponding
reduction in government spending. This feature is a result of the assumed
homotheticity of the utility function with respect to private and public con-
sumption. It implies that in the absence of outstanding government debt,
technology shocks do not give rise to uncertainty about future debt and
taxes (up to rst order accuracy).15 Technology shocks thus do not give rise
to government budget risksunder the optimal stabilization policy.
The situation di¤ers notably when government debt is positive. With
positive debt levels, it is suboptimal to o¤set the drop in tax revenue fol-
lowing an adverse technology shocks entirely by a corresponding reduction
in government spending. This is so because large part of the steady state
tax revenue is used to pay interest on debt, so that an enormous govern-
ment spending reduction would be required to balance the budget. This is
suboptimal because the marginal utility of government consumption is very
high since the steady state level of government spending is low at high debt
levels, see the discussion in section 5. While government spending falls more
on impact when debt is high, the reduction is still insu¢ cient to balance the
budget. The government is thus forced to issue additional debt and to in-
crease taxes to nance it. As a result, the debt level and the tax rate move
permanently higher. This is an example of Barros (1979) tax smoothing
result, but emerging here in a setting with endogenous spending decisions,
endogenous interest rates and following a technology disturbance. With a
12The second order e¤ects are discussed in the next section.
13The assumed shock process implies that the economy spends less that 0.13% of the
quarters in states with such or worse technology levels.
14The response is slightly more muted because the negative wealth e¤ect of technology
shocks implies that labor supply expands somewhat.
15This continues to be true when looking at second order accurate impulse responses in
the next section.
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positive amount of government debt, technology shocks thus give risk to
government budget risksunder the optimal stabilization policy, i.e., future
debt and tax paths are uncertain and depend on the shock realizations.
Interestingly, when government debt is positive, it also becomes optimal
to lower nominal interest rates on impact rather than increasing them, as
would be optimal in the absence of government debt. This reduces real
interest rates and implies a less severe collapse in output and consumption
than otherwise in the rst period. It also generates some small amount of
ination, which helps to reduce the real value of maturing government debt.
Yet, as is known from the work of Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004), it is
suboptimal in the presence of even small amounts of nominal rigidities to
bring about large price level changes, i.e., to use nominal bonds as a state
contingent source of taxation. This nding shows up here in the form of
rather small movements of ination following a fairly large sized shock.
The rst order accurate impulse response dynamics depicted in gure
5 show that the larger the amount of outstanding government debt, the
larger are the budget risksassociated with technology shocks. Therefore,
although up to rst order accuracy, the government debt/GDP ratio evolves
locally like a random walk, the fact that budget risk increases with the debt
level should provide incentives to reduce government debt over time in the
presence of shocks.16 This issue is investigated in the next section, which
analyzes the second order accurate optimal equilibrium dynamics.
7 Optimal Debt Dynamics
This section evaluates to what extent the budget riskassociated with out-
standing government debt documented in the previous section provides in-
centives to reduce government debt over time. To capture the optimal policy
implications arising from budget risk considerations, this section considers
a second order accurate approximation to optimal policy and the implied
debt/GDP dynamics.17
As before, consideration is restricted to a local analysis around some
pre-specied deterministic Ramsey steady state. The analysis thus ignores
the incentives for debt reduction arising from global constraints such as
borrowing constraints. As shown in Aiyagari et al. (2002), such global
constraints can provide additional incentives for debt reduction. The point
here is to show that potentially important incentives for debt reduction exist
even when restricting consideration to a local analysis.
Figure 6 depicts the optimal drift in the debt/GDP ratio as a function
of assumed steady state debt/GDP ratio. Specically, the gure reports the
constant in the state transition law for bonds emerging from a second order
16 In the absence of shocks, it is optimal to hold debt constant over time.
17The solution approach is explained in appendix A.2.
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accurate approximate solution to optimal monetary and scal policy using
the baseline parameterization, and scales this constant by the GDP level.
It shows that there is a tendency for debt to fall whenever it is positive
and to increase whenever it is negative. This suggests that over time debt
optimally converges to zero.18
Quantitatively, the drift term turns out not to be very large in the
baseline parameterization. This nding is fairly robust to many parameter
changes, except when the unpredictable components of technology shocks
increase. To illustrate this nding, gure 7 depicts the optimal debt drift
under less persistent technology shock processes. The standard deviation of
the innovation to the technology process is thereby adjusted so as to keep
the overall unconditional standard deviation of technology shocks unchanged
when compared to the baseline specication. As the gure shows, it may
then be optimal to reduce the debt to GDP ratio by as much as 0.6% per
year. This shows that second order e¤ects can easily become quantitatively
signicant.
Figure 8 illustrates this fact by comparing the rst and second order
accurate impulse responses to a negative technology shock.19 It shows that
important di¤erences emerge between a rst and second order accurate ap-
proximation of the optimal response of taxes and government debt. Espe-
cially, the optimal evolution of government debt deviates signicantly from
random walk behavior.
Interestingly, the optimal speed of the debt drift in gures 6 and 7 is
non-monotone in the initial debt/GDP ratio. Specically, as the debt/GDP
ratio increases, the optimal speed of debt reduction rst rises but then falls.
It is actually not surprising, that this relationship can be non-monotone.
While budget risk increases with the debt level, as shown in the previous
section, the cost of repaying debt may equally rise, due to the existence of a
La¤er curve. The cost of repayment may thereby rise faster or slower than
the benets of repayment, so that the relationship between the debt/GDP
ratio and the optimal speed of debt repayment can be non-monotone.
Figures 6 and 7 also show that for su¢ ciently negative debt levels the
government actually reduces the speed at which it decumulates its claims
against the private sector. While budget risk increases as debt becomes
more negative, the utility consequences of any given amount of risk also
decrease. This is so because utility is at locally with respect to tax changes
at the point where the government holds just enough claims allowing it to
implement the rst best equilibrium in the absence of shocks. As a result,
18This di¤ers from the results in Aiyagari et al. (2002) where debt converged to a large
negative value. Unlike in Aiyagari et al, the present setup does not allow for lump sum
rebates of government revenue.
19The assumed shock persistence is z = 0:5. As before, the standard deviation of the
technology shock innovation is adjusted so as to keep the unconditional standard deviation
of technology shocks unchanged compared to the baseline parameterization.
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the optimal speed of debt increase may be non-monotonically related to the
level of claims that the government has accumulated against the private
sector.
8 Optimal Debt Dynamics with Exogenous Spend-
ing
Most of the public nance literature treats the process for government spend-
ing as exogenous.20 Moreover, in some of these models, exogenous govern-
ment spending shocks are the only source of randomness, so that budget risk
is independent of the government debt level.21 This section shows that debt-
dependent budget riskcontinues to provide incentives for debt reduction if
one allows for technology shocks, even in a setting with an exogenously xed
spending path. Indeed, the incentives for debt reduction can become even
stronger. The analysis in this section is also of interest, because it is infor-
mative about the optimal speed of debt reduction in a setting where insti-
tutional restrictions prevent the government from adjusting public spending
in response to aggregate technology shocks.
Figure 9 illustrates the e¤ects of exogenously xing government spending
on the optimal debt drift and compares it to the drift emerging with endoge-
nous spending decisions.22 To make the comparison meaningful, the gure
reports for each given deterministic steady state value of the debt/GDP ra-
tio the drift coe¢ cients that emerge from a second order approximation of
the two models, assuming that in the model with exogenous spending the
level of public consumption is exogenously xed at the deterministic steady
state value arising in the model with endogenous spending decisions. The
gure thus isolates for each given level of the debt/GDP ratio the e¤ects of
not being able to adjust the government spending level following technology
shocks.
The gure shows that the unavailability of the government spending
margin provides additional incentives for debt reduction whenever the gov-
ernment has positive amounts of debt outstanding. This suggest that inertia
or exogeneity of government spending plans amplies the optimal speed of
debt reduction compared to the situation studied in the paper thus far.
Also, unlike in the case with endogenous spending, the zero debt steady
state ceases to be an absorbing state when spending is exogenous.23 With
zero debt and exogenous spending, technology shocks require an adjustment
20See, for example, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004).
21See, for example, the classic papers by Barro (1979) and Aiyagari et al. (2002).
22The gure assumes z = 0:5. As before, the standard deviation of the technology
shock innovation is adjusted to keep the unconditional standard deviation of technology
shocks unchanged compared to the baseline parameterization.
23With endogenous spending this is true up to second order of accuracy.
24
-300 -200 -100 0 100 200 300 400
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
debt/GDP ratio
A
nn
ua
l d
rif
t i
n 
th
e 
de
bt
/G
D
P
 ra
tio
endogenous g (rho=0.5)
exogenous g (rho=0.5)
Figure 9: Optimal Speed of Debt Reduction: Exogenous vs. Endogenous
Gov. Spending
of taxes and debt, i.e., give rise to budget risk. As gure 9 shows, this pro-
vides incentives for the government to accumulate claims against the private
sector.
9 Conclusions
This paper shows that the recent increase in government debt has important
implications for the optimal conduct of monetary and scal policy. Higher
government debt requires lowering the average level of public spending and
exposes scal budgets to increased risks following technology shocks or -
more generally - uctuations in the tax base. These budget risk considera-
tions can provide quantitatively important incentives to reduce government
debt over time, but the optimal speed of debt reduction is not necessarily
monotone in the level of accumulated government debt. As a result, optimal
debt dynamics deviate in important ways from random walk behavior. The
results in this paper suggest that debt optimally converges to zero over time
and that the optimal speed of debt reduction tends to increase if govern-
ments cannot adjust their spending plans following uctuations in the tax
25
base.
For a number of reasons, the present paper may have signicantly un-
derstated the optimal speed of debt reduction. First, global inequality con-
straints, such as the borrowing limit implied by the La¤er curve, may provide
additional incentives for debt reduction. Taking this constraint into account
requires solving the model fully non-linearly, along the lines of Adam and
Billi (2006). This appears to be an interesting task for future research.
Second, the present paper focused exclusively on technology shocks. Other
shocks, e.g., shocks to agentsdiscount factors give rise to additional sources
of budget risk, as they move the real interest rates at which the government
can renance its outstanding debt. Exploring the quantitative relevance of
such alternative disturbances for the optimal speed of debt reduction ap-
pears to be an equally interesting task for future research.
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A Appendix
A.1 FOCs and Solution Strategy
The rst order conditions of problem (17) with respect to the decision vari-
ables (ct; ht;t; Rt; t; gt; bt) are
ct : 0 = uc;t +
 
1t   1t

ucc;t(t   1)t   1t
ucc;tzt

ht

1 +  +
uh;t
uc;t(1  t)

zt

  1t
uc;tzt

ht
 
 ucc;t
(uc;t)
2
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!
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2t
ucc;t
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tuh;tht
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2
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1t
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
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uhh;t
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t)

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
+ 3t zt   4t
t
1  t
1
uc;t
(uhh;tht + uh;t) (31)
t : 0 =
 
1t   1t

uc;t(2t   1) + 2t
uc;t
(t)
2   3t (t   1) + 4t
Rt 1bt 1
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Rt : 0 =  2t
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(Rt)
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(33)
t : 0 =  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(34)
gt : 0 = ug;t   3t   4t (35)
bt : 0 = 
4
t   Et4t+1
Rt
t+1
(36)
The derivatives with respect to the rst three Lagrange multipliers are given
by:
uc;t(t   1)t   uc;tzt

ht

1 +  +
uh;t
uc;t(1  t)

zt

 Etuc;t+1(t+1   1)t+1 = 0 (37)
uc;t
Rt
  Etuc;t+1
t+1
= 0 (38)
ztht   ct   
2
(t   1)2   gt = 0 (39)
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We can then dene 5 state variables and the corresponding 5 transition
equations:
zt+1 = z + zzt + z;0"z;t+1 (40)
1t+1 = 
1
t (41)
2t+1 = 
2
t (42)
bt =
t
1  t
uh;t
uc;t
ht + gt +
Rt 1
t
bt 1 (43)
Rt = Rt (44)
where the forth equation is the derivative of the Lagrangian (17) with respect
to the last multiplier and the it denote the lagged Lagrange multipliers
associated with the forward looking constraints in (17). In the last equation,
Rt denotes both the future state variable and the current decision variable.
As we show below, optimal policies are going to be a function of these state
variables.
The state transition equations (40)-(44), the FOCs (30)-(36), and the
implementability constraints (37)-(39) form a system of 5 state transition
equations and 10 additional equations of the form
Etf(xt+1; yt+1; xt; yt) = 0 (45)
which is of the form analyzed in Gomme and Klein (2010). As argued in
Gomme and Klein, a nonlinear solution to this system of nonlinear expec-
tational di¤erence equations is given by nonlinear decision functions of the
form
yt = g(xt; ) (46)
where yt =
 
ct; ht;t; Rt; t; gt; 
1
t ; 
2
t ; 
3
t ; 
4
t

denote the decision variables
(note that this list does not contain bt) and where xt =
 
zt; 
1
t ; 
2
t ; bt 1; Rt 1

denotes the state vector. The parameter  thereby denotes the standard
deviation of the technology shock innovation. The nonlinear state transition
is thereby described by equations (40)-(44).
A.2 Local Approximation of Optimal Dynamics
Let (x; y) denote a deterministic steady state of the nonlinear equation sys-
tem (45) solving
f(x; y; x; y) = 0
A second order approximation of the non-linear solution (46) around this
steady state is given by a decision function
eyt = ky + F ext + 1
2
 
I5 
 ex0tEext
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and a state transition function
ext+1 = kx + P ext + 1
2
 
I10 
 ex0tGext + "t+1
where the tilde indicates that a variable is expressed in terms of deviations
from its steady state. The approximation is taken with respect to the ex-
pansion variable  around  = 0 and the values for (ky; F; E) and (kx; P;G)
can be computed using the code provided by Gomme and Klein (2010). The
rst order accurate dynamics of the model can be obtained by the same
equations when setting ky; kx; E;G all equal to zero.
A.3 Ramsey Steady State
To simplify matters we start by eliminating taxes and the government budget
constraint from the Lagrangian (17). Note that the FOCs (6) and (7) imply
 uh;t
uc;t
= (1  t)wt = wt   twt
and from steady state version of the government budget (26) we have
twt =
gt + ex
ht
Substituting the latter equation into the former gives the following expres-
sion for the real wage
wt =  uh;t
uc;t
+
gt + ex
ht
which allows expressing the Phillips curve without reference to taxes. The
simplied constant debt version of the Lagrangian (17) is then
max
fct;ht;t;Rt1;gtg1t=0
min
f1t ;2t ;3t g
1X
t=0
tu(ct; ht; gt) (47)
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The FOCs consist of the three constraints and
ct :uc;t +
 
1t   1t 1
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t
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
   3t = 0 (52)
We now impose steady state conditions by dropping time subscripts. From
(51)
2 = 0
so that (50) gives
 = 1
and from (13) one obtains
R =
1

Using these results and imposing them on the steady state version of the
derivative of (47) with respect to 1t one obtains
 uh
uc
=
1 + 

  g + ex
h
(53)
which is equation (28) in the main text. Since uh < 0 and uc > 0 the
previous equation implies
1 +    g + ex
h
< 0 (54)
In the steady state equations (48), (49) and (52) simplify to
uc   1ucch


1 +    g + ex
h

  3 = 0 (55)
uh   1 


uhhh+ uc
g + ex
h

+ 3 = 0 (56)
ug + 
1 

uc   3 = 0 (57)
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where 3 > 0 denotes the marginal utility of relaxing the resource constraint.
The previous FOCs indicate the alternative possible uses of additional re-
sources, namely private consumption (equation (55)), leisure (equation (56))
and public consumption (equation (57)). Since public consumption is only
one of three possible uses of resources, it must be the case that 3  ug
in the optimum. Equation (57) therefore implies that 1  0. Combining
equations (55) and (57) to eliminate 3 then gives
uc =
ug + 
1 ucch

h
1 +     g+exh
i
(1  1  )
From 1  0 and (54) then follows that
uc =
ug + 
1 ucch

h
1 +     g+exh
i
(1  1  )
 ug + 1ucch


1 +    g + ex
h

 ug
and since uc >  uh, we have ug >  uh, as claimed in the main text.
A.4 Utility Parameters and Ramsey Steady State
Here we show how the utility parameters !h and !g are determined by the
Ramsey steady state values. Let variables without subscripts denote their
steady state values and consider the Ramsey steady state with constant debt
from appendix A.3. Since  = 1 the Phillips curve constraint in (47) implies
1 +    

!hh
'c  g + ex
h

= 0 (58)
which delivers
!h =

1+
   g+exh

h'c
(59)
and allows to determine the steady state values of uh and uhh. Adding up
equations (55) and (56) then delivers
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uc + uh



uhhh+ uc
g+ex
h

+ ucch
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and (56) gives
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
It then follows from (57)
!g = g

3   1 

uc

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